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insured. If not brought in as a party defendant, any later contest9
against her may be barred by the contestability period in the contract.
Co-makers of a note,10 partners as to a firm note,1 1 and insured
and beneficiary of a life policy, 12 have been held united in interest,
while connecting carriers in interstate commerce, 1 3 the owner of
premises and a sub-contractor,14 and the vendor and vendee in an
executory contract for the sale of a lot 15 have been held not to be
united in interest in cases where, one of the parties not having been
served, the Statute of Limitations was interposed as a complete bar
to the action.'

J.K.

CUSTODY
R-ELIGION OF PARENT CoRPus.-Relator is the bedridden mother of a ten-year-old
child, whose custody she seeks as against the father, with whom they
both reside. The mother claims that the child is taken by the father
to a religious sect,' of which he is a member, remote from their place
of residence, thereby depriving her of her legal right to joint custody,
and impairing the physical and moral well being of the child. The

PARENT AND CHILD

HABEAS

9
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Patterson, 1 Fed. 126 (D. Mass.
1880). In Shaw v. Cock, 78 N. Y. 194 (1879), where by order amending the
summons a new party defendant was brought in, the court held that the suit
was only commenced .as to him when thus brought in and if between the time
of the commencement of the action as to the original parties, and the time
when the new defendant was brought in the period of limitation had expired,
a plea of the statute in bar of his liability is good.

"Davison v. Budlong, 40 Hun 245 (N. Y. 1886).

' Howell v. Dimock, 15 App. Div. 102, 44 N. Y. Supp. 271 (2d Dept.

1897).
2 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Di Novi, 139 Misc. 1, 247 N. Y. Supp.
578 (1931) (Summons served upon beneficiary within contestability period,
held to be effective service upon the incompetent insured and the beneficiary).
" Germini v. Southern Pacific Co., 209 App. Div. 442, 204 N. Y. Supp. 603
(1st Dept. 1924).
'4Martens v. O'Neill, 131 App. Div. 123, 115 N. Y. Supp. 260 (2d Dept.
1909).
'Moore v. McLaughlin, 11 App. Div. 477, 42 N. Y. Supp. 256 (3d Dept.
1896) (Action brought against both to foreclose a mechanic's lien on a building erected by the purchaser will not be deemed to have been commenced
against the purchaser by service of the summons on his co-defendant.).
"' 1 WAIT's NEW YORK PRACTICE (3d ed. 1930) 88: If one of the parties
united in interest in an action on a promissory note "was not served in the original action, a subsequent action under section 1185 of the Civil Practice Act
to charge him as a joint debtor would not be a continuation of the former
action but an entirely new action, and would be barred by the statute of limitations ten years after the former judgment was obtained."
' The Megiddo, of Christian persuasion, whose beliefs are not contrary to
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father claims the court has no jurisdiction since the proceeding was
initiated by habeas corpus; and welfare of the child should be the sole
consideration, irrespective of the religious views of either parent.
Held, order of the Special Term 2 and Appellate Division 3 reversed,
and the writ of habeas corpus dismissed on the grounds that a dispute
between parents, about care of the child, when it does not involve
anything immoral or harmful to the welfare of the child, is beyond
the reach of the law. Proceeding by habeas corpus was just as proper
as petition and order. People ex rel. Blanche Sisson v. Howard
Sisson, 271 N. Y. 285, 2 N. E. (2d) 660 (1936).
Habeas corpus was originally limited to restraint cases.4 This
has been modified both by decisions r and statute, 6 making it applicable
to custody of child cases, on the broad principle that the welfare of
the child should be the paramount consideration. 7 Because of this
2

Instant case, 156 Misc. 236, 281 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1935)

(Special term

gave exclusive custody and control to the mother on the grounds it was not
for the best interests of the child "to mature in this atmosphere counseled
one way and then another, bewildered, called upon in her immaturity to determine questions beyond most adults, her pleasures and recreations circumscribed, developing not in normal ways, but quite to the contrary.").
' Instant case, 246 App. Div. 151, 285 N. Y. Supp. 41 (3d Dept. 1936)
(special term order affirmed and modified granting joint guardianship to both
parents with heavy restrictions on the father, namely-father shall not take
the child from her home town without the relator's consent; nor take said

infant from relator's home for more than two hours at any time, and then

only after personal notice to the relator of the intended absence and purpose
and place of any proposed visitation).
'People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser, 150 App. Div. 541, 135 N. Y. Supp.
274 (1st Dept. 1912), aff'd, 206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912) ("The sole
purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment."); People ex rel. Klee v. Klee, 202 App. Div. 592, 195 N. Y. Supp.
778 (4th Dept. 1922); People ex tel Hower v. Foote, 130 Misc. 224, 223
N. Y. Supp. 681 (1927).
'In case at bar, habeas corpus was sufficient since the rights of parties
were regarded, evidence heard and proceeding determined in same way as if
initiated by petition; N. Y. Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U. S. 429, 27
Sup. Ct. 53 (1906) ("In such case the question of freedom is not involved
except in the sense of a determination as to which custodian shall have
charge of one not entitled to be freed from restraint.") ; Matter of Standish,
233 N. Y. 689, 135 N. E. 972 (1922); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148
N. E. 624, 40 A. L. R. 937 (1925) (the custody of children, except when
adjudged as an incident to an action for divorce or separation, is to be
determined in a habeas corpus proceeding) ; People ex rel. Multer v. Multer,
107 Misc. 58, 175 N. Y. Supp. 526 (1919) (the special term entertained a
habeas corpus proceeding initiated by the husband, where he and his wife
were temporarily living together) ; People ex rel. Spreckels v. De Ruyter,
150 Misc. 323, 325, 269 N. Y. Supp. 100, 103 (1934) (the concern of equity
is not for the parents, but for the children).
IN. Y. Dox. REL. LAw § 70 gives the right to parents living apart.
This, however, does not abrogate the common-law rights where the parents
are living together, and the welfare of an infant is involved.
Campbell v. Sewell, 159 So. 813 (Ala. 1935); see 1 SCHOULER, DOmESTic RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) §§ 743, 744. Accord: Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257
I1. 328, 100 N. E. 892 (1913) ; In. re Pryse, 85 Kan. 556, 118 Pac. 56 (1911).
Contra: Eaton v. Eaton (N. J. Eq. 1936), N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1936,
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underlying theory, it has been found best to change the common law 8
by statute 9 giving the parents equal rights in respect to control over
and custody of their children.
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the habeas corpus petition,
has given the claimants a free hand to settle their own domestic difficulties in the education of their child; according to their own conscience, patience, and self-restraint. This follows the weight of authority lo in that a parent's views, unless affecting the health or morals
of the child, should not be regulated by the court. The danger is that
a court may be led to adopt a principle, due to equitable consideration
in some particular case, which when carried to logical application to
other facts, would lead to unfortunate and unjust results.-1 It is not
the province of a court to smoothe domestic difficulties where legal
rights are not invaded. Such problems are ethical in nature.
The case presents no question of the father's lack of right to have
joint custody of the child with his wife, since there is no evidence that
he was unkind, immoral or not competent, 12 except for his religious
views-which the law does not attempt to regulate unless they are
contrary to positive law, or injure another in his legal rights.' 3 The
lower court 14 has apparently based its decision on their disagreement
with appellant's religious views. This appears because of the fact that
though granted joint custody, the father was, in practical effect,' 5 pro-

P. 1; 49 HAuv. L. REv. 831; Lester v. Lester, 222 N. Y. 546, 118 N. E. 1065
(1917); People ex rel. McCanliss v.McCanliss, 255 N. Y. 456, 175 N. E.

129 (1931); People ex rel. Woolston v. Woolston, 135 Misc. 320, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 185 (1929); People ex rel. Roberts v. Kidder, 137 Misc. 347, 242 N. Y.
Supp.. 108 (1929); People ex rel. Glendening v. Glendening, 159 Misc. 215
(1936); Pappas v. Pappas, 208 N. C. 220, 179 S. E. 661 (1935); Wanner
v. Williams, 117 Pa. Super. 59, 177 AtI. 329 (1935); Commonwealth ex rel.
Trott v. Wilcox, 118 Pa. Super. 363, 179 At. 808 (1935).
'People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N. Y. 1842) ; Hernandez

v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641 (1905) ; State ex rel. Weaver v. Hamans,
159 So. 31 (Fla. 1935) ; Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191, 153 S.W. 243 (1913) ;
State v. Giroux, 19 Mont. 149, 47 Pac. 798 (1897); People v. Sinclair, 91
App. Div. 322, 86 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1st Dept. 1904); 2
JURISPRUDENCE

9

§§ 1341, 1342.

STORY,

EQuITy

N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 81: "A married woman is a joint guardian
of her children with her husband, with equal powers, rights and duties in
regard to them." Haskell v. Haskell, 201 App. Div. 414, 194 N. Y. Supp. 28
(1st Dept. 1922), af'd, 236 N. Y. 635, 142 N. E. 314 (1923).
"Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill.
328, 100 N. E. 892 (1913); State v.
Traharn, 125 La. 312, 51 So. 216 (1910); In re Vanderbilt, 245 App. Div.
211, 281 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1st Dept. 1935); It re Samuels, 245 App. Div.
902, 282 N. Y. Supp. 353 (3d Dept. 1935); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I.
131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); see note 7, supra.
'Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 84, 150 N. E. 605, 609 (1926).
' See Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E. 429 (1932);
People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 246 App. Div. 151, 285 N. Y. Supp. 41 (3d
Dept. 1936).
"Johanson v. Borders, 155 Ark. 218, 244 S. W. 30 (1922); Hernandez
v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641 (1905).
"See notes 2, 3, supra.
"See note 3, supra.
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hibited from taking his child to the Megiddo center in Rochester.
If this is so,16 the court virtually would have the power to grant custody of the child to whomsoever it pleased, depending on the political, social, or religious views of the presiding justices, basing its decision on the infringement of the rights of the opposing claimant.' 7
S.S.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR FALSE
REPRESENTATIONS OF AGENT-NoTICE OF AGENT'S LIMITATIONS.-

Plaintiff commenced this action for rescission of the written contract,
wherein defendant corporation agreed to sell its wall texture products
to the plaintiff corporation, on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations by defendant's sales agent that Duratint had not been sold
in plaintiff's distribution territory and that plaintiff would be sole
distributor in the city of Buffalo. Testimony discloses that the plaintiff's officers were fully aware of defendant's agent's limitation of
authority to make any representations of this sort and furthermore
two clauses in the contract read that "the company" (defendant)
"makes no representation regarding previous sales in distributor's
territory" and "no representation or warranty of any kind shall be
binding upon either the Duralith Corp. or the dealer unless it has
been incorporated in this agreement." Plaintiff's contention that one
cannot exempt himself from liability for fraud by inserting in his
contract a shielding or blanket clause was sustained by the Court
of Appeals but, held, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff reversed
on the ground that a principal cannot be made liable for the false
representations of his agent where the party dealing with the agent
has specific notice that he is acting beyond the limitation of his authority. Ernst Iron Works, Inc. v. Duralith Corporation,270 N. Y.
165, 200 N. E. 683 (1936).
A principal is not liable for loss caused to a third person by
reason of his reliance upon a fraudulent representation of an agent
unless the representation was authorized either expressly, impliedly,
or apparently, or unless it was subsequently ratified., When dealing with a special agent, known to be such, a third person is charge"The dissenting opinion of the Appellate Division of the case at bar
held that the modification of the special term order gave the father exclusive control, where, as a matter of fact, its effect was just the opposite.
"In case at bar the prolonged religious trips were held to be a violation
of the relator's rights.
' Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79 (1867) ; Forster v. Wilhusen, 14 Misc. 520,
35 N. Y. Supp. 1083 (1895); MATHESON, LAW OF AGENCY (6th ed. 1935) 104.

